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Abstract 
Management scholars have long stressed the importance of evolutionary process-
ses for inter-firm cooperation but have mostly missed the promising opportunity 
to incorporate ideas from evolutionary theories into the analysis of collaborative 
arrangements. In this paper, we first present three rules for the evolution of coope-
ration – kinship selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. Second, we 
apply our theoretical considerations, enriched with ideas from cultural anthropol-
ogy, to the context of a specific and particularly attractive type of cooperative ar-
rangement, the franchise form of organization. Third, we provide a preliminary 
empirical test with regards to conditions under which evolutionary modes can se-
cure cooperative behavior. We conclude by summarizing our results and deriving 
fertile areas for further research. 
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 Introduction 
The formation of alliances and networks is now a common way to organize interfirm relation-
ships. Strategic management research has recognized this trend and has tried to explain inter-
firm cooperation on the basis of transaction costs, agency costs, competitiveness, trust and 
related constructs such as social capital (e.g., Uzzi, 1997; Gulati, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002). 
However, one point of criticism of these streams of literature has been raised early by Doz 
(1996: p. 55-56): “The growing literature on the strategic alliance phenomenon suffers from 
imbalance. While the importance of evolutionary processes is well recognized in many sub-
fields of management and of organization theory […], studies of strategic alliances as evolu-
tionary processes are scarce. […] Game theorists point to interesting evolutionary features of 
behavior in cooperation experiments (e.g., Axelrod, 1984), but the applicability of their analy-
sis to interorganizational relationships remains untested.” In other words, the field of strategic 
management – though having a tradition in postulating the importance of long-term collabora-
tions for gaining competitive advantages (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 2000; Zollo et al., 
2005) – has up to now mostly missed the promising opportunity to fully incorporate ideas 
from evolutionary (game) theories into the analysis of interfirm cooperation. Furthermore, 
contributions oftentimes seem to lack a rigorous presentation of arguments in the form of 
conceptual or mathematical models. For these reasons, the pre-conditions and detailed 
mechanisms for cooperation (the “rules of the game”) relevant for the dynamic evolution and 
proliferation of cooperative behavior in interfirm relationships still remain under-researched 
and not clearly formalized.  
Although some authors have contributed to close this gap in strategy research1, in this 
paper we try to promote a more broad approach to the emergence of cooperation in interfirm 
alliances based on the combination of two bodies of literature, namely management theory 
                                                 
1 For example, Parkhe (1993), Cable and Shane (1997), and more recently, Arend and Seale (2005) and Hanaki 
et al. (2007), employ an iterated prisoners’ dilemma approach to analyze alliance activity and the emergence of 
interfirm cooperation. On the other hand, Cowan et al. (2007) study an agent-based model of network formation.  
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 and evolutionary theory. Recent research in evolutionary (game) theory has offered a variety 
of pathways to the establishment of cooperative behavior (e.g., Gintis et al., 2001; Fehr et al., 
2002; Henrich, 2003; Henrich and Henrich, 2006; Nowak, 2006b). This strand of literature is 
appealing for management scholars since it does not only identify evolutionary mechanisms 
(like kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity; see below) which provide solutions for the di-
lemma of cooperation, but it also rigorously reveals an explicit calculus for the prevalence of 
cooperation in terms of a cost-benefit consideration. In addition, we refer to recent work from 
the field of evolutionary theory complementing these insights (e.g., Henrich, 2003; Henrich 
and Henrich, 2006), which indicates that culture or fast operating cultural transmission me-
chanisms might serve as a link between evolutionary reasoning and managerial perspectives 
on collaborations.  
Hence, to further our understanding of the emergence of cooperative behavior in allian-
ces and networks, we connect theories of different degrees of abstraction, evolutionary (game) 
theory and cultural anthropology, and show their sound applicability to real-life economic 
phenomena such as network organizations. By doing so, we aim at offering a novel frame-
work for approaching the question of how to manage the evolution of cooperation.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss circumstances under 
which cooperative behavior might develop and present three evolutionary models of coope-
ration: kinship selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity. We enrich these princi-
ples by referring to newer insights on the influence of cultural transmission mechanisms like 
prestige-biased and conformist transmission. We then proceed to outline the applicability of 
our theoretical considerations in the context of a specific and particularly attractive type of 
cooperative arrangement, the franchise form of organization. We provide a preliminary em-
pirical test with regards to working conditions that should influence the functionality of evo-
lutionary rules for cooperation in securing inter-franchisee collaboration. Finally, we conclude 
by summarizing our results and by deriving areas for further research.  
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An Evolutionary Explanation of Cooperation in Alliances and Networks 
As strategic alliances are potentially unstable and are quite frequently terminated due to inter-
nal tensions and conflicting forces (Das and Teng, 2000), understanding the main mechanisms 
which allow the evolution of cooperation is important for alliance management (Ireland et al., 
2002). In this section we want to present the main evolutionary principles which describe how 
cooperation can develop and be sustained. We enrich these principles by referring to newer 
insights on the influence of cultural transmission mechanisms like prestige-biased and con-
formist transimission.  
We consider a population of individuals, e.g. member firms of a strategic alliance, 
where each individual has the option to cooperate, i.e. help another individual, or to defect, 
i.e. provide no help. The recipient of the altruistic act receives a benefit of b. Helping some-
one is costly, however. We represent the cost to the donor by c. For cooperation to make any 
sense, it is assumed that c<b. Let us now describe the payoffs occurring in an interaction be-
tween two individuals. If a cooperator meets another cooperator, both receive the benefit b, 
but have to pay the cost c for helping each other. Therefore, the payoff to both of them is b–c. 
If only one player helps and the other does not, then the defector receives the benefit without 
paying the cost, whereas the donor pays the cost without receiving the benefit. This yields b 
for the defector and –c for the donor. If both players do not help each other, the payoff is 0 for 
both. Hence, writing down the payoff matrix of an interaction between cooperators and defec-
tors, we obtain  
DC
cb
bccbcb
D
C
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−−
)0,0(),(
),(),(
.          (1) 
Given that the decision-making environment of the players is characterized by this pay-
off matrix, cooperation will not be observed among rational players. The reason is that no 
matter what the other player is doing, it is always better for a player to defect (in other words, 
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 defection is a dominant strategy). The unique Nash equilibrium predicts defection of both 
players, hence receiving a payoff of 0. This is not too surprising, since our payoff matrix can 
be related to the prisoner’s dilemma game by setting the reward for mutual cooperation R=b–
c, the temptation to defect T=b, the sucker’s payoff S=–c, and the punishment for mutual de-
fection P=0, and we have T=b>R=b-c>P=0>S=–c, as required for a prisoner’s dilemma 
game (see e.g. Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006a). Hence, the rationality of the 
players leads to defection of both players. The prisoner’s dilemma framework has been used 
frequently by management scholars to capture the essence of social dilemmas and to gain in-
sights into the evolution of cooperation in interfirm relations, see e.g. Parkhe (1993), Cable 
and Shane (1997), Das and Teng (2000), Arend and Seale (2005), and Hanaki et al. (2007).  
Note that even if we let natural selection work and consider how the share of coopera-
tors and defectors in a population of boundedly rational players evolves over time, the same 
result emerges. To see this, imagine a mixed population of cooperators and defectors. Let the 
frequency of cooperators in the population be x and the frequency of defectors be 1–x.  Then 
given the payoff matrix in (1), the average payoff (or the fitness) of a cooperator is 
( ) ( ) ( )(1 )Cf x b c x c x bx c= − + − − = −  and the fitness of a defector is ( )Df x bx= . Therefore, 
defectors dominate cooperators (in terms of fitness). If we assume that higher payoff strate-
gies displace lower payoff strategies, the frequency of defectors will steadily increase until all 
cooperators have become extinct. This can also be demonstrated by referring to the so-called 
replicator dynamics.2 Defection is an evolutionary stable strategy (see e.g. Weibull, 1995, for 
a formal definition) and, therefore, a population of defectors cannot be invaded by a (small) 
group of cooperators. 
                                                 
2 The replicator dynamics says that if a strategy earns an above-average payoff, then its share in the population 
increases, whereas otherwise it decreases. Formally, [ ( )C ]x x f x f= −& , where x&  represents the change in the 
share of cooperators and (1 ) ( )C Df xf x f b c x= + − = −  is the average payoff in the population. Substitution 
leads to the differential equation (1 )x cx x= − −& , which shows that the percentage of cooperators will decline 
steadily (since the right-hand side is always negative). 
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 Since cooperation cannot develop in a situation captured by the payoff matrix presented 
in (1), further mechanisms are required. Evolutionary theories of cooperation provide a sur-
prisingly simple core principle for the emergence of cooperation, namely that cooperation can 
evolve when circumstances are such that cooperators tend to cooperate with other coopera-
tors. To put it differently, cooperation can evolve under circumstances which allow coopera-
tors to bestow benefits preferentially on cooperators (Henrich and Henrich, 2006; Nowak, 
2006b). Formally, this can be expressed by the condition b cβ > , where the coefficient β 
measures the degree to which ‘being a cooperator’ predicts ‘bestowing benefits on other co-
operators’ (see Henrich, 2003; Henrich and Henrich, 2006). In the simplest case, β can be 
interpreted as the probability of bestowing benefits on another cooperator, but in the remain-
der of this section we will present three different principles, kin selection, direct reciprocity, 
and indirect reciprocity, and illustrate that the coefficient β either represents the share of in-
teractions among related individuals, or the probability that the interaction with the same in-
dividual will continue to the next round, or the probability of knowing the reputation of an-
other player. 
The principles all show how cooperation can evolve and ultimately dominate in a popu-
lation of (boundedly rational) players. Our exposition is based on Nowak (2006b; see also the 
supporting online material) and on Henrich and Henrich (2006). Throughout we make refer-
ences to related work in evolutionary (game) theory and cooperation in strategic alliances as 
well. To overcome some of the well-known problems (e.g. incomplete information, large 
groups) of applying these principles to management issues, we make reference to new insights 
in evolutionary theory on cultural transmission mechanisms and how they lead to the evolu-
tion of cooperation and its stability. 
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 Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness 
One mechanism through which cooperation can develop is the “relatedness of players”, where 
in the context of strategic alliances and networks “relatedness” is used only in a metaphoric 
sense. As both social psychology and organizational learning research have revealed, in-
dividuals or firms are generally more attracted to others who resemble themselves (e.g., 
Byrne, 1969; Chung et al., 2000; Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000). Individuals are more open to si-
milar others due to better possibilities for validating and assimilating received information, re-
duced cognitive dissonance, and increased predictability of behavior, for instance (e.g., Jack-
son et al., 1991; Cable and Shane, 1997). Accordingly, research on potential solutions to the 
prisoner’s dilemma has indicated that cooperation is more likely to emerge if actors show 
high degrees of homogeneity (e.g., Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977; Cable and Shane, 1997). Fur-
thermore, demographic similarity also encourages cooperation (see also Henrich and Henrich, 
2006). McPherson et al. (2001) put it this way: “We are more likely to have contact with 
those who are closer to us in geographic location than those who are distant.” (p. 429). In 
terms of effort this means that “It takes more energy to connect to those who are far away 
than those who are readily available.” (p. 429).  
To describe the game among related players we can employ the idea that interactions 
among related players are more likely.3 Let the share of each players’ interactions with its 
relatives be r, where the relatives use the same strategy as the player.4 The other share of in-
teractions of a player, 1–r, is assumed to be with random individuals from the population, 
                                                 
3 A second, more direct, way to introduce relatedness, uses the concept of inclusive fitness. This concept is taken 
from evolutionary biology, where fitness denotes the capability of genetic information to spread in a population. 
Inclusive fitness also considers the contribution stemming from all alleles in the gene pool which are shared by 
an individual and its relatives. Consider now a measure for the relatedness of individuals, r, which is a number 
between 0 and 1. Then, inclusive fitness is composed of the fitness (the direct payoff) of the focal individual 
enhanced by the contribution from the relative, which is given by the relative’s payoff multiplied by the related-
ness measure r. Using this idea it can be shown that the fitness of cooperators is higher than the fitness of defec-
tors if r>c/b. In this case cooperation is an evolutionary stable strategy and dynamically stable with respect to 
the replicator dynamics. The mathematical details can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
4 We here understand relatedness as the probability of sharing the same strategic orientation (i.e., cooperation vs. 
defection) which is reflected by or even rooted in common traits, such as shared cultural backgrounds, ex-
periences, attitudes, and the like. Concepts from evolutionary theory and sociology offer similar insights, in 
particular, “green beard” models (e.g., Dawkins, 1976) and “homophily” in human societies (e.g., McPherson et 
al., 2001). 
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 where these other players can either be cooperators or defectors. We denote the frequency of 
cooperators in the population as x and the frequency of defectors as 1–x. Then, given the pay-
off matrix in (1), the average payoff (the fitness) of a cooperator is 
))(1)(1()()1()()( cxrcbxrcbrxfC −−−+−−+−= . On the other hand, the fitness of a defec-
tor is xbrxrxbrrxfD )1(0)1)(1()1(0)( −=−−+−+= . The linear fitness functions just de-
scribed can be obtained from a payoff matrix of the form  
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,     (2) 
which captures the interaction between players in a population where related players have a 
fixed share of encounters with each other and they select the same strategy. The question now 
is, what is the critical share of interactions between relatives such that cooperation can de-
velop? It is easy to see that cooperators dominate defectors if br–c>0. In this case the fitness 
of cooperators is higher than the fitness of defectors and cooperation is a dominant strategy. If 
the share of interactions among related individuals exceeds the cost-benefit ration, r>c/b, then 
cooperation can develop. Under this condition, cooperation is an evolutionary stable strategy 
and the replicator dynamics shows that cooperation is dynamically stable. 
In the literature on evolutionary biology, the condition r>c/b is referred to as Hamil-
ton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964), and obviously the share of interactions among related individu-
als, r, replaces the coefficient β in the core principle presented above. In terms of this core 
principle the interpretation of the “relatedness condition” is that individuals take the evidence 
like similarity (e.g. cultural aspects) or geographical proximity as cues to assess the likelihood 
that they are bestowing benefits on another cooperator. The derivations above have been kept 
intentionally simple, but recent work shows that this rule also plays an important role for the 
evolution of altruism in the standard n-player’s prisoner’s dilemma (Fletcher and Zwick, 
2007). The authors demonstrate that the parameters in an n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
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 can be explicitly connected to the concept of inclusive fitness, Hamilton’s rule, and multilevel 
selection theory, where the r-value in their derivation is expressed as the between-group vari-
ance over total variance in the cooperative trait. Hamilton’s rule in multilevel selection theory 
is fundamental for understanding assortment and (variance in) group selection. The productiv-
ity of groups with a high proportion of cooperators is higher than the productivity of groups 
with fewer cooperators, and this variance in productivity favors groups with a high share of 
cooperators in the between-group selection process. For more details we refer to Fletcher and 
Zwick (2007). 
 
Direct Reciprocity (or “If you scratch my back I scratch yours”) 
Direct reciprocity describes a mechanism which allows cooperation to emerge when there are 
repeated encounters between the same two individuals. That the frequency of interactions and 
the time horizon over which encounters between individuals occur matter for the stability of 
interfirm relationships has been demonstrated before by Kogut (1989), Parkhe (1993), Cable 
and Shane (1997), Das and Teng (2000), among others. Moreover, since the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma framework also “[…] addresses the social context in which the parties are embedded 
[…]” (Cable and Shane, 1997: p 147), the concept of direct reciprocity is related to the rela-
tional embeddedness or cohesion perspectives on networks, where the latter emphasize the 
direct ties between actors as a source of information about behavior and expectations (see 
Gulati, 1998; Cowan et al., 2007). 
To see how repeated interactions can lead to cooperation, consider again the payoff ma-
trix given in (1), but now assume that the individuals play the game repeatedly. The probabil-
ity that the next round of the game is played is denoted by w, and therefore the game ends 
with probability 1-w. What is a good strategy to play this repeated game? The set of all strate-
gies consists of rules assigning the decision to cooperate or to defect to any history of the 
game. So obviously, the dimension of this strategy space is enormous (cf. Nowak, 2006a). 
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 Hence, here we focus on the well-known strategy Tit-for-tat (TFT), which has been proven to 
be robust and very successful in simulated computer tournaments (Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981; Nowak, 2006a). TFT starts with cooperation and then replicates what the other player 
did in the previous round. Although very simple, it can be proven that, once established, TFT 
cannot be invaded by any other strategy if the probability w of meeting again is sufficiently 
large (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Hence, TFT is evolutionary stable and cooperation pre-
vails in the population.5 To give a flavor of the arguments, let us consider TFT playing 
against the strategy ALLD, a strategy which always defects. Given that the average (or ex-
pected) number of rounds played is 1/(1-w), the payoff matrix of the repeated game is  
( , ) ( ,
1 1
( , ) (0, 0)
TFT ALLD
b c b cTFT c b
w w
ALLD b c
− −⎛ ⎞−⎜ − −⎜⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
)⎟⎟
                                                
,         (3) 
since TFT versus TFT leads to mutual cooperation and all the other encounters lead to defec-
tion with a future payoff of 0. The question now arises if TFT is evolutionary stable, i.e if it is 
stable against invasion by ALLD. Using the replicator equation, it is easy to see that (TFT, 
TFT) is stable if (b–c)/(1–w)>b, which shows that TFT can resist invasion if w>c/b. In other 
words, if the “shadow of the future” (Parkhe, 1993; Das and Teng, 2000) is rather long, then 
cooperation can prevail.  
Relating this result back to the core principle in evolutionary theories of cooperation, it 
is obvious that w, the probability that the interaction with the same individual will continue to 
the next round, replaces the coefficient β. Clearly, the longer the interaction occurs with the 
same cooperating individual, the higher the degree of cooperation which can be sustained.  
Two remarks are in order concerning this result. First, note that ALLD is also evolu-
tionary stable (since it is a strict Nash equilibrium). Thus, one might wonder about the evolu-
 
5 Note that for the payoff matrix (1) the condition R=b-c>(S+T)/2=(b-c)/2 holds. This guarantees that if the game 
is played repeatedly, an agreement to alternate between cooperation and defection does not lead to a higher pay-
off than strict cooperation. 
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 tionary mechanism to explain the evolution of cooperation the presence of two coexisting 
evolutionary stable equilibria. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) refer to kinship and clustering as 
possible explanations. For example, a cluster of individuals using the TFT strategy can be-
come viable (and cooperation can evolve) in an environment consisting of ALLD if the pro-
portion of interactions within a cluster is sufficiently large. Second, the condition w>c/b also 
emerges in the literature on repeated games, a class of games which has been used to address 
questions like the emergence of trust and corporate culture (see e.g. Kreps, 1990). In a re-
peated game setup fully rational players use trigger strategies to play the game, and coopera-
tion is observed by the threat of punishment (see, e.g., Gibbons, 1992). Although interesting, 
this approach has been criticized on various accounts. The difference with regard to the ap-
proach taken in evolutionary game theory is that players are myopic and do not systematically 
try to influence the other player’s future decisions (Friedman, 1991, 1998). The assumption 
here is that successful strategies spread in the population by being copied, imitated and 
learned, and therefore, although the results seem the same, the approaches differ substantially 
in their reflections of real-world behavior. 
 
Indirect Reciprocity (or “I scratch your back and somebody else will scratch mine”) 
Cooperation enabled by the rule of Direct Reciprocity is based on repeated encounters be-
tween the same two players. If the probability of meeting again in the next round is suffi-
ciently large, then cooperation is an evolutionary stable strategy. Social systems and markets 
do not exclusively rely on the repeated interactions between the same individuals, however. 
Reputation mechanisms make it possible for players not directly involved in any face-to-face 
transaction to assess other player’s decision-making behavior by observing how these players 
have behaved in the interactions with other individuals in the population (Parkhe, 1993; 
Cowan et al., 2007; Hanaki et al., 2007). Therefore, if a “good” reputation leads other players 
to cooperate, it pays for an individual to invest in reputation, i.e., cooperate with a particular 
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 player, even if it is certain that the transaction with this player is only one-shot. Since players 
with a “bad” reputation can be punished by being exempt from further cooperation (they are 
not “trusted” anymore), an obvious link with moral norms in human societies emerges (No-
wak and Sigmund, 2004). Moreover, there is an obvious link to the concept of structural em-
bededdness, since this concept has been often connected to the notion of ‘status’ of actors in 
networks (Gulati, 1998; Cowan et al., 2007).  
Although a formal treatment of the mechanism of indirect reciprocity is quite compli-
cated and beyond the scope of this paper (see, in particular, Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a, b), a 
simplified version of the model can be presented to derive the mechanism under which coop-
eration can develop in a situation where indirect reciprocity plays a role. Let us consider the 
two strategies, defection and cooperation, and let q denote the probability of knowing the 
reputation of another player. For defectors the reputation of other players does not matter, 
they never help. On the other hand, cooperators only abstain from helping a player if this 
player’s reputation indicates a defector. Therefore, a cooperator helps (i) another cooperator 
and (ii) a defector with probability (1-q). This situation can be captured in the payoff matrix  
, (1 )( ), (1
(1 ) , (1 )( ) (0, 0)
C D
C b c b c q c q b
D q b q c
− − − − −⎛⎜ − − −⎝ ⎠
) ⎞⎟       (4) 
and cooperation is an evolutionary stable strategy if the condition q>c/b holds. In other 
words, if the probability of knowing the reputation of another player exceeds the cost-benefit 
ration, then cooperation prevails and can resist invasion by some other (mutant) strategy. 
Clearly, the probability q replaces the coefficient β in the core principle. 
In the model presented above reputation is captured by a state which can be “good” or 
“bad”, depending on the decision to cooperate or defect in the previous round. Panchanathan 
and Boyd (2003) use a different approach. In their paper, instead of focusing on the actions of 
others, they consider standing strategies which also require information about intent. That is, 
defection can be justified if the partner is in bad standing (i.e., this partner defected before 
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 with another partner). Such a justified defection has no effect on the individual’s current 
standing. Panchanathan and Boyd (2003) demonstrate in their paper that in their model with 
standing based strategies cooperation can be evolutionary stable. 
 
The role of cultural transmission in the evolution of cooperation 
In the literature a variety of difficulties in using the above stated principles for explaining the 
evolution of cooperation have been discussed (for an overview, see Henrich and Henrich, 
2006). Although direct reciprocity works well in small groups, it seems to work less well in 
larger groups. In noisy environments misunderstandings and misreadings of actions can lead 
to a reduction in the degree of cooperation. Furthermore, the success of a particular strategy in 
achieving cooperation through direct reciprocity depends heavily on the interaction environ-
ment, i.e. the strategies used by other individuals. The key to cooperation based on indirect 
reciprocity is the availability of reliable information on the reputation of another individual. 
As a result “[…] variables such as the size of the cooperative group [….], the population size 
[…], the density of social connections between individuals in the population, and people’s 
beliefs about gossip will strongly influence the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity.” (Henrich 
and Henrich, 2006: p. 237).  
The difficulties to explain large-scale cooperation in noisy environments among mem-
bers of large groups with reference to direct and indirect reciprocity demonstrate that there is 
a need to complement these principles with some other mechanisms. In addition, the evolu-
tionary mechanisms used so far in this paper mostly refer to genetic evolution. But the speed 
of change required by human society in general and the business sphere in particular is con-
siderably higher than what can be realized by genetic evolution (Henrich and Henrich, 2006: 
p. 234). So it becomes necessary to integrate an evolutionary sub-mechanism that is able to 
bring about the needed change quickly. In this vein, we also need to explain the variety of dif-
ferent sorts of behavior and norms in different societies, groups and business organizations 
13
  #0801 
 
 (Henrich and Henrich, 2006). For both challenges one type of explanation is available: cultu-
ral capacities and cultural transmission mechanisms respectively. It is cultural capacities that 
vastly increase the potential for reciprocity by providing all sorts of learning devices. These 
cultural capacities help us “altering the social environment by building new forms of organi-
zation” (Henrich and Henrich, 2006: p. 235). In the following, we will turn to particular cul-
tural transmission mechanisms that can explain the characteristics of business organizations.  
One possible direction of argumentation has been pointed out by Mark Granovetter, 
who has outlined how social structure – e.g., the strength of personal ties – affects the quality 
of information flows and the ability to reward or punish interactants (Granovetter, 1985, 
2005). More specifically, researchers in evolutionary (game) theory have recently demon-
strated that cultural transmission mechanisms can support the evolution of cooperation, where 
culturally acquired strategies, beliefs, etc. are learned by observation and interaction within 
social groups.6 In particular, on the basis of so-called “context biases”, individuals select the 
features they want to copy (the behaviors, ideas, etc.) while being guided in their social lear-
ning by informative signals which are used to choose appropriate “role-models”. The two 
most prominent manifestations of context biases are (1) the success and prestige bias and (2) 
the conformist bias. Success- and prestige-biased transmission works as a ranked-based copy-
ing bias, where individuals follow a tendency to copy strategies of more successful and better 
skilled people (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Conformist transmission entails a psychology 
to imitate high frequent – i.e., most common – patterns of behavior. This approach to adapta-
tion is appealing when information about others is noisy and behavioral differences do not 
covary with success levels. Both approaches may lead to group homogenization and coopera-
tion. On the one hand, high performing cooperative individuals could serve as role-models for 
others who imitate their respective traits (success and prestige bias). On the other hand, com-
                                                 
6 See Henrich (2003) and Henrich and Henrich (2006) for a review of the relevant literature. Economists also 
turned to this topic and generally understand culture as a set of shared beliefs, knowledge, and behavioral norms 
which influences preferences and decision making and substitutes for explicit communication (see, similarly, 
Besanko et al., 2000; Hermalin, 2000). 
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 petitive pressures tend to sort out low-performing strategies, which could result in the domi-
nance of cooperation within the population and in a tendency of copying remaining traits 
(conformist transmission). 
Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual model and illustrates important steps of our analy-
sis as well as the theoretical perspectives we take on. Starting from the evolutionary rules of 
direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and kin selection, we argue that these rules are com-
plemented by cultural sub-mechanisms in the short run. Enriched with insights from the the-
ory of networks, we discuss and test determinants of network cooperation which are argued to 
affect direct and indirect reciprocity and their ability to promote the evolution of cooperation. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The Case of Franchising – Hypotheses development 
The evolutionary models presented above incorporate dynamic processes of cooperative rela-
tionship development in a way that static agency and property rights theories are not capable 
of. To exemplify the relevancy of evolutionary arguments for the management of cooperative 
arrangements, we now use business-format franchising, one of the oldest and most successful 
inter-organizational forms, as the setting for our analysis. Franchising involves an upstream 
parent corporation, the franchisor, selling the right to market a product and/or service using a 
proven business format to local downstream firms, the franchisees. 
For several reasons, franchising provides an attractive research environment to substan-
tiate the basic tenants of this paper. First, it accounts for a major fraction of retail sales both in 
the U.S. and increasingly in other, especially European, countries (International Franchise 
Association, 2007). Understanding processes which promote cooperation is thus desirable for 
this organizational form. Second, the opportunities for cooperative activities, e.g., inter-firm 
knowledge exchange, are favorable within franchise chains. They develop naturally when the 
franchisor brings the participants of the network together, e.g., through experience meetings 
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 and system-wide training days. Third, on the franchisees’ side, residual claimancy provides 
store owners with incentives to take advantage of collaborative activities within the network. 
Franchisors, in turn, benefit from positive externalities arising from cooperation between store 
owners. Subsequent enhancements of outlet performance might lead to higher royalties and 
strengthen the network as a whole. Finally, franchising is similar to other hybrids so that our 
insights should not only be of interest to scholars concerned with franchising but also to those 
studying inter-organizational relationships more generally. 
Most importantly, franchising not only offers a clear example in which managers cho-
ose policies to secure collaborative efforts, but it also bears additional features which promote 
the application of evolutionary reasoning. As we will show below, not only direct and indirect 
reciprocity but also the mode of kin selection suite well as evolutionary rules for explaining 
cooperative behavior within franchise chains. We argue that, in franchising, evolutionary 
processes foster the proliferation of cooperation in two basic stages. In the first stage, the 
franchisor pursues one of his core duties in managing the chain, i.e., screening and matching 
agents with the ability to manage well and with a tendency to behave cooperatively (see, simi-
larly, Minkler, 1992; Jambulingam and Nevin, 1999; and more general, Ireland et al., 2002). 
In the second stage, franchisees find together for interaction, while in the face of mutual ap-
propriation hazards – in particular, free riding on joint efforts – cooperation is enhanced by 
the two fundamental mechanisms of direct and indirect reciprocity complemented by cultural 
transmission.  
We will now explain in more detail how and under which circumstances this two-stage 
process promotes the emergence of inter-franchisee cooperation. Accompanied by the devel-
opment of testable propositions, we will also outline some basic working conditions – deter-
mined by the firms’ managers – that should influence the functionality of evolutionary rules 
for cooperation in securing cooperative behavior.  
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 First Stage – Kin Selection on the Franchisor’s Side 
Franchise networks’ success depends to a large degree on the systematic screening and mat-
ching of franchisees (Tatham et al., 1972; Justis and Judd, 1989; Ireland et al., 2002). By in-
stalling partner selection mechanisms, headquarters seek to set favorable conditions for local 
entrepreneurship and high-quality input provision. Typically, franchisors stipulate specific 
skills and personal characteristics required to successfully apply for a franchise, such as per-
sonality, experience in the industry, selling skills, etc. (Jambulingam and Nevin, 1999). Ar-
guably, one central aim of this selection process is to ensure cooperative intent, i.e., the will-
ingness to contribute to joint productions such as mutual learning and maintaining the brand 
name. As evolutionary scholars have found, a population of only cooperators has the highest 
fitness – a population of defectors has the lowest (e.g., Nowak, 2006b). 
Franchisors should provide fertile conditions for the emergence of cooperation within 
their networks by structuring and homogenizing franchisee populations (Ireland et al., 2002, 
on managing alliances). Screening and matching franchisees on the basis of consistent criteria 
enhances partner similarity, e.g., in terms of cooperative intent, beliefs, and skills. As we have 
delineated above, evolutionary theory suggests that cooperation is more likely to prevail if 
cooperators are able to preferentially get in touch with other cooperators. In franchise sys-
tems, we expect a higher fraction of cooperation-oriented firms than in other network forms 
of organization due to the thorough screening processes which are commonly employed in 
franchising. As a result of matching efforts, one might metaphorically interpret a franchisee as 
being the franchisor’s “offspring”, i.e., being affiliated with the same chain could be regarded 
as a predictor of sharing similar beliefs or expectations about the value of cooperation. Build-
ing on these grounds, we infer that structuring franchisee populations by means of screening 
enhances franchise partners’ degree of relatedness (again: metaphorically speaking) and simi-
larity. In kin selection, the degree of relatedness, r, depicts the share of interactions with one’s 
“relatives” who use the same strategy. We have shown in the previous section that coopera-
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 tion can develop when the share of interactions among related individuals (cooperators meet 
cooperators) exceeds the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation: r>c/b. By homogenizing the fran-
chisee population, headquarters contribute to raising the share of cooperators within the 
community (see figure 2). Thus, through screening, franchisors could set advantageous condi-
tions for cooperation to prevail as an evolutionary stable strategy. Furthermore, by promoting 
a culture of cooperation and trust, cultural transmission mechanisms can support the evolution 
of cooperation among franchisees particularly well.  
To summarize, our idea in taking up “kin selection” as a pathway to franchisee coopera-
tion builds on the logic that franchisors structure and homogenize franchisee populations via 
selection procedures based on consistent matching criteria and thereby foster partner simi-
larity (with respect to personal characteristics, such as entrepreneurial skills, and cooperative 
intent). Similarity, in turn, enhances the probability of personal interactions and, most impor-
tantly, the probability that cooperators get in touch with other cooperators. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Proposition 0: In franchising, we expect to observe higher degrees of coopera-
tion among the systems’ partners than in other network forms of organization 
with less thorough screening processes. Screening and matching efforts should 
enhance the degree of relatedness, r, between the players involved and thereby 
promote the evolution of cooperation through kinship. Cultural transmission 
mechanisms are then more likely to support the proliferation of cooperation. 
 
Second Stage – Inter-Franchisee Cooperation (Direct and Indirect Reciprocity) 
Given the franchisor-determined structure of the franchisee population, store owners find to-
gether for task-oriented and social interaction, e.g., via training days and self-initiated mee-
tings. Practitioners and scholars have often attributed the dominance of the retail and service 
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 sectors by franchises to cooperation-related benefits: sharing a well-reputed brand name, ac-
cess to the chain’s experience, and being part of a community of entrepreneurs capable of 
translating a business concept into action (e.g., Love, 1986; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Shane, 
2005). Arguably, the core component of inter-franchisee cooperation refers to mutual learn-
ing, i.e., transferring knowledge from one firm to another as well as creating new knowledge 
through interaction (Larsson et al., 1998). In contrast to franchisors, who generally codify 
knowledge and distribute standardized routines (Bradach, 1998; Knott, 2003), store owners 
are more conceived as repositories for tacit knowledge, e.g., concerning consumer wants, that 
is idiosyncratic to local markets (Michael, 1996; Argote and Darr, 2001; Kalnins and Mayer, 
2004). Exchanging such complex knowledge largely demands personal face-to-face coopera-
tion – “[…] the interorganizational learning of alliances, not the vicarious learning of bench-
marking […]” (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998: p. 463). 
As Henrich and Henrich (2006: p. 224) have pointed out, the human’s social learning 
capacities outreach all other species. The authors argue that selection processes favor social 
learning and, thus, cultural capacities for imitation and adaptation, if it is possible to take ad-
vantage of others’ experience. For example, because of cognitive limitations and costs of in-
formation acquisition, individuals will often be better off if they connect with, listen to, and 
learn from successful people via social interaction. However, the core dilemma is that “being 
a cooperator” allows exploitation by firms who seek to maximize their appropriation of joint 
efforts through free-riding (Larsson et al., 1998; Henrich and Henrich, 2006). Individuals will 
then retain less resources for own growth and prosperity if they have a tendency to incur costs 
in order to help others. Given this dilemma, we have shown above that the evolutionary rules 
of direct and indirect reciprocity can secure cooperative behavior because they allow interac-
tants to direct their favors preferentially to other cooperators. 
In the following, we discuss three particular contingency variables – i.e., franchisee-re-
lated working conditions set by the franchise management – that should affect direct and indi-
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 rect reciprocity’s effectiveness in leveraging franchisee cooperation (see figure 1). These con-
tingency variables are: (1) franchisee’s network position, (2) franchisee’s length of chain af-
filiation, and (3) local network (over-)size. 
Network position. Direct reciprocity represents a pathway to cooperation since tit-for-tat 
increases the chances of channeling benefits only to cooperators. Here, cooperation can be 
secured if the probability, w, of another encounter between the same individuals exceeds the 
cooperation’s cost-benefit ratio: w>c/b. Under indirect reciprocity, individuals may interact 
seldom or occasionally, but they collect information about their potential partners’ former be-
havior in relationships with third party interactants. Indirect reciprocity fosters cooperation if 
the probability, q, of knowing another player’s reputation exceeds the cost-benefit ratio of 
cooperation: q>c/b. Cultural learning capacities are an important basis for reciprocal mecha-
nisms of cooperation as cooperators have to evaluate, store, and remember information about 
others’ past behavior (Henrich and Henrich, 2006). 
If franchisees occupy central network positions, i.e., if they are situated in locations 
with a relatively high number of store owners in the neighborhood, they should face fertile 
conditions for inter-partner collaboration, especially in terms of mutual knowledge transfer 
(see, similarly, Powell et al., 1996; Gulati, 1998; Tsai, 2004; Hanaki et al., 2007). Store own-
ers being co-located exhibit manifold and less costly opportunities for frequent interactions, 
e.g., personal visits of other store owners can be realized with less effort of time. Managers of 
nearby franchises are thus more likely to repeatedly meet face-to-face than those separated by 
greater distance, leading to a higher probability, w, of another encounter. Equally, the prob-
ability, q, that a cooperating franchisee knows the reputation of another store owner should 
increase in case of proximity since it will be easier for co-located franchisees to remember, 
observe, and validate behavioral information – a firm’s reputational capital should be more 
accurately noticed by nearby partners due to high degrees of visibility. Co-located franchisees 
should thus be better able to enhance the degree of bestowing benefits only on cooperators. 
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 Substantiating this assertion in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, researchers have argued 
that cooperation is more likely to emerge when it is easy to observe and to obtain information 
about others’ strategies (Abreu et al., 1991; Cable and Shane, 1997).  
In light of indirect reciprocity, being proactively helpful to others – even without di-
rectly receiving any benefits in return – may be a reasonable strategy because being generous 
and “making a show of it” contributes to reputation building via costly signaling (Henrich and 
Henrich, 2006: p. 238). Henrich and Henrich (2006) have pointed out that such cooperative 
“broadcast acts”, e.g., getting involved in a franchisee council, will be more promising if ma-
ny members of the broadcasting unit’s social network are present. Apparently, cooperative 
efforts are more visible in the close neighborhood of a franchisee, where the probability of 
meeting again is higher. Thus, the costs of broadcasting acts should spread more effectively if 
potential cooperators belong to the same geographical area; in this case, the probability of the 
signaling unit to be (locally) known as a cooperator should increase more strongly. 
Proposition 1: Franchisees tend to cooperate more with others if they occupy 
locations with a relatively high number of owners in their close neighborhood. 
Co-located store owners should display both a higher probability, w, of meeting 
again, and a higher probability, q, of knowing the reputation of another player. 
Cultural transmission mechanisms are then more likely to support the prolifera-
tion of cooperation. 
 
Relationship duration. Another important contingency factor which could determine the 
effectiveness of direct and indirect reciprocity in promoting cooperative behavior is length of 
network membership. Direct and indirect reciprocity crucially depend on interaction experi-
ence and memory. Arguably, relationship duration can be interpreted as an indicator for the 
breadth of past interactions with other members of the chain, e.g., via general seminars, and 
might thus resemble franchisees’ amount of experience working together. Experience wor-
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 king together, in turn, deepens the knowledge of other members’ intentions and capabilities, 
which may aid to reliably identify appropriate partners (see, similarly, Borgatti and Cross, 
2003; Reagans et al., 2005; Zollo et al., 2005). More experienced franchisees – with long-
term affiliations to their network – should thus be more likely to have access to the relevant 
knowledge about others’ past interactions and attitudes towards cooperation. In other words: 
the interaction experience gathered over time should enhance the probability, q, of knowing 
the reputation of another franchise partner, which contributes to satisfying the condition 
q>c/b for indirect reciprocity to secure cooperation. 
In addition, firms ought to develop more fine-grained capabilities for interacting and in-
formation processing over time such that experience in collaborating provides a promising 
source for further cooperative activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Powell et al., 1996; Si-
monin, 1997; Ingram and Baum, 2001). Building on these grounds, we infer that franchisees 
with long-term network affiliations are more likely to be commonly identified as cooperators 
(or defectors) since their past behavior is more apparent.7 If past behavior suggests that an 
individual is a cooperator, selection pressures should favor those who bestow benefits on that 
person, especially due to expected return flows of benefits (see, in more detail, Henrich and 
Henrich, 2006). Furthermore, and with a focus on direct reciprocity, length of network mem-
bership might also be conceived as an indicator for a franchisee’s tendency to further remain 
in the network. Relationship length has been argued to positively influence expectations about 
the continuity of the exchange in the future (Dant and Nasr, 1998). For more experienced 
franchisees, the expected probability, w, of another encounter should thus be relatively high, 
which would contribute to satisfy the condition w>c/b for direct reciprocity to foster the evo-
lution of cooperation. For direct reciprocity to work, the probability of another round of inter-
action has to exceed the cooperation’s cost-benefit ratio. As Henrich and Henrich (2006: p. 
                                                 
7 For example, from the perspective of the franchisor, the age of a relationship could be interpreted as an indica-
tor for past agent behavior, namely whether decision leeway has been utilized constructively (see, generally, 
Eisenhardt, 1989: p. 62). 
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 233) have argued: “[…] being NICE should depend on cues about how long interactions might 
go on […].”8  
Proposition 2: Franchisees tend to cooperate more with others as length of net-
work membership increases. Long-term affiliations to franchise chains should 
both enhance the probability, w, of meeting again, and the probability, q, of 
knowing the reputation of another player. Cultural transmission mechanisms are 
then more likely to support the proliferation of cooperation. 
 
Local network (over-)size. We have argued above that franchisees face fertile conditions 
for inter-partner cooperation if they occupy locations with a relatively high number of other 
store owners located in their neighborhood. However, the beneficial effects of holding central 
network positions might be offset by countervailing effects of oversized network communi-
ties. Franchisees sometimes complain of a phenomenon termed “territorial encroachment”, 
i.e., franchisors may add too many units proximately to franchisees’ existing outlets, which 
could lead to more intense intra-chain competition (Kaufmann and Rangan, 1990; Sheridan 
and Gillespie, 1995; Kalnins, 2004).9 In case of exclusive territory clauses being absent or not 
set in a competition-attenuating fashion, defective behavior, e.g., mutual withholdings of in-
formation, appears as a likely consequence of oversized communities. Shane (2001) put for-
ward further arguments for agency hazards to exacerbate with increasing networks. In particu-
lar, monitoring becomes more difficult when networks grow, and since the value of a chain’s 
brand name gets higher with the number of related outlets (Lafontaine 1992), the free-riding 
problem is more severe for larger systems than for smaller ones. In consequence, both the abi-
lity to bestow benefits preferentially on cooperators and the probability of knowing one’s co-
operative intention would decline in case of network size being too large. 
                                                 
8 Basically, reciprocal strategies enabling long-term cooperation are NICE, which means that, in general, success-
ful strategies cooperate at the beginning of an interaction without suspicion (Henrich and Henrich, 2006: p. 233). 
9 The threat of territorial encroachment stems from the conflict that franchisees maximize store profits, but fran-
chisors tend to maximize the chain’s sales since they usually receive a royalty based on franchisee revenue. 
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 Not only from the viewpoint of intra-chain competition can we expect deteriorating ef-
fects of network oversize on cooperation. Observing and remembering others’ behavior be-
come more complex tasks as local communities increase, e.g., limited informational capaci-
ties impose boundaries for handling large networks. Relatedly, it will be harder for a fran-
chisee to build up and memorize transaction histories with an oversized number of units since 
the probability of meeting again in repeated encounters, w, might decline with a greater com-
munity of interactants. Gathering information about potential partners’ behavior would be 
harder to realize in this situation so that the probability of knowing another player’s reputa-
tion, q, could decrease as well. For indirect reciprocity to work, reliable reputational informa-
tion is needed (Henrich and Henrich, 2006). Yet, in case of local network size being extraor-
dinary large, there is a higher risk of receiving inaccurate and ambiguous information about 
what potential partners did in the past, which makes reciprocal strategies more difficult to 
pursue. In line with these arguments, Henrich (2003: p. 11) concludes: “The amount of co-
operation supported by indirect reciprocity declines exponentionally with increasing group 
size […].” Accordingly, scholars have shown that indirect reciprocity favors cooperation 
when populations are relatively small and individuals tend to interact repeatedly (e.g., Boyd 
and Richerson, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a; Henrich, 2003). 
Proposition 3: Franchisees tend to cooperate less with others as they perceive 
their local network as being oversized. Network oversize should both decrease 
the probability, w, of meeting again, and the probability, q, of knowing the repu-
tation of another player. Cultural transmission mechanisms are then less likely 
to support the proliferation of cooperation. 
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 A Preliminary Empirical Test 
Sample 
By conducting an empirical test within a single franchise chain, we seek to give first insights 
into the viability of our propositions 1 to 3, which refer to conditions affecting the functional-
ity of the evolutionary modes of direct and indirect reciprocity. For these purposes, we used 
cross-sectional data collected from a sample of franchisees operating in a large German fran-
chise chain (with about 485 franchise units) from the travel industry. The data were gathered 
through mail surveys and for purposes of a broader research project on franchisee satisfaction 
(see Schlüter, 2001) during the year 2003. A self-administered questionnaire was sent to the 
focal chain’s franchised outlets. The franchisor provided the postal addresses of the partners. 
The selection of the Likert-type questionnaire items partly emerged from a qualitative-
explorative pre-study involving franchisors, consultants, and franchisee focus groups. A total 
of four moderated focus groups gathered 15 franchisees from eight different chains. In the 
framework of these meetings, probands were given the opportunity to express important fac-
ets of their business relationships and franchisee satisfaction as well. Despite collaboration 
with the focal system’s head office in conducting the survey, participation remained volun-
tary. The survey yielded a sample of 168 observations.  
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our study was franchisee cooperation which we operationalized 
using items directly related to inter-franchisee exchange. In the questionnaire, we asked store 
owners to rate their contribution and inclusion to cooperative activities in three ways, each 
tapping core aspects of the partners’ face-to-face interaction: (1) “I exchange views on busi-
ness issues with other franchisees on a regular basis”, (2) “Actually, I only meet other fran-
chisees on system-wide meetings and events” (reverse-coded), and (3) “In case of any ques-
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 tions, I can contact other franchisees anytime”.10 The Likert-type items grasped the respon-
dent’s degree of confirmation to each statement on a 7-point scale ranging from “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”. Reliability of the scale was assessed by Cronbach’s alpha. The 
alpha value of 0.66 was above the lower limit of acceptability, set at 0.60 for newly developed 
scales (Hair et al., 1998). Results of a principal component factor analysis revealed that the 
three dimensions were part of a higher order construct. All items loaded on one factor (factor 
loadings ≥ 0.62), suggesting that they were associated with each other. A composite measure 
was built by summing and averaging – using equal weights – the scores of the items. 
 
Independent Variables 
Network position. To measure centrality of franchisee’s network position, we first calculated 
the distances between each of the chain’s stores. In the questionnaire, respondents were asked 
to specify the first two digits of their postal code (158 owners did so). Although information 
about the full postal code, comprising five digits, would have added precision to the calcula-
tions, only two digits were requested in order to guarantee anonymity.11 To calculate distance, 
a standard route planning software was used, introducing a franchisee’s two-digit postal code 
as the starting point and the two-digit postal code of the potential partner as the destination. In 
a second step, we specified a geographical boundary up to which store owners can be consi-
dered as nearby neighbors. We chose a distance of 50 kilometres (approximately 31 miles) as 
a reasonable proxy to tap spatial closeness. To concretize whether a franchisee occupies a 
central network position, we counted the number of store owners being co-located within the 
radius of 50 kilometers. Note that with higher distances as proxies for closeness, the relation-
ship between network position and franchisee cooperation weakened. 
                                                 
10 Note that all items have been translated from German to English. 
11 A two-digit postal code covers a surface of approximately 6,000 square kilometres. There are 99 different two-
digit postal codes in Germany. 
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 Relationship duration. Franchisees were asked to indicate the year in which they joined 
the network, from which relationship length with the company (in years) was calculated. 
Network (over-)size. Using a 7-point Likert-type scale (“strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree”), franchisees were asked to rate their degree of confirmation to the following state-
ment: “The number of partners has meanwhile exceeded a reasonable limit”. This evaluation 
indicated whether franchisees perceived their community as being oversized; network over-
size, in turn, implies more intense intra-brand competition and high coordination costs. 
 
Control Variables 
To strengthen the analysis, variables were controlled which may, in addition to the independ-
ent variables, influence the intensity of franchisees’ cooperation efforts. 
Opportunism of other franchisees. Using a 7-point scale (“strongly disagree” to “strong-
ly agree”), franchisees were asked to rate their degree of confirmation to the following state-
ment: “Each franchisee is primarily concerned about his own advantage”. Franchisees who 
feel that others primarily follow selfish goals are less likely to expect mutuality in colla-
borative activities and should thus spend fewer resources on cooperation. 
Other franchisee-related working conditions. We additionally incorporated the follow-
ing three controls as aspects of store owners’ working environment: (1) the number of fran-
chisee’s outlets, (2) the number of franchisee’s employees, and (3) working hours per week. 
In franchising, multi-unit ownership describes a situation where one entrepreneur owns more 
than one outlet. Darr et al. (1995) found knowledge to transfer across stores owned by the 
same franchisee but not across stores owned by different franchisees; in this vein, the demand 
for cooperation-related benefits might be weaker for multi-unit owners. A similar reasoning 
could apply with regards to the size of franchisee’s business activities, as measured by the 
number of employees. With larger firm size, better resource equipment, and a higher potential 
for realizing scale economies, store owners could be less dependent on cooperation benefits. 
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 Franchisees were asked to indicate the number of employees using a 5-point scale.12 Finally, 
we asked store owners to specify their working hours per week. The higher the amount of 
working hours per week, the higher the opportunity costs of spending resources on coopera-
tive efforts might be. 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations for each of the variables. The 
average franchisee perceived his cooperation activity level slightly above a moderate extent 
(mean = 4.21; s.d. = 1.24). Most notably, significant correlations to the franchisee cooperation 
scale emerged for network position, relationship duration, the perception of an oversized net-
work, and opportunism of other franchisees.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Regression Results 
As a final step of our preliminary empirical test, we regressed franchisee cooperation on the 
independent variables by employing ordinary least squares regression. Note that, within our 
cross-sectional setting, we have not assessed how the independent variables directly affect the 
evolutionary rules of direct and indirect reciprocity. Thus, our results are intended to give 
only first insights into the viability of our propositions. For reliability reasons, variance infla-
tion factors were investigated to test for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. 
All values lay well below the usual threshold of 10 (the maximum observed was 1.186), be-
yond which problems of multicollinearity can be considered severe (Hair et al., 1998). Further 
tests indicated that the assumptions of normally distributed random errors and homoscedastic-
ity were met. The results from the OLS model are displayed in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In the regression model, network position (b = 0.066, p < 0.05), relationship duration (b = 
0.047, p < 0.10), and opportunism of other franchisees (b = -0.180, p < 0.01) came out sig-
                                                 
12 The scale was constructed as follows: less than three employees = 1; three to four employees = 2; five to six 
employees = 3; seven to eight employees = 4; more than eight employees = 5. 
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 nificant. The positive coefficients of the network position scale and relationship duration indi-
cated general support of Propositions 1 and 2. These propositions suggested that franchisees 
face favorable conditions for direct and indirect reciprocity to secure cooperation if they dis-
play a relatively high number of co-located owners and hold long-term affiliations to their 
network. However, since the coefficient of the network (over-)size variable was not signifi-
cant – event though the corresponding scale showed a significant negative correlation with 
franchisee cooperation –, we found no support for Proposition 3. Within this proposition, we 
argued that the conditions for direct and indirect reciprocity would be less advantageous if 
franchisees evaluated their network as being too large. To gain further insights into the opera-
tion of the network-oversize variable, we grouped the chain’s franchisees into two ordered 
categories and then conducted Mann-Whitney-U tests. Most interestingly, franchisees who 
did not evaluate their network as being oversized, displayed significantly higher relationship 
durations, lower levels of perceived opportunism, and higher values of the cooperation scale 
(see Table 3). Even though OLS regression could not confirm a negative effect of the oversize 
variable on franchisee cooperation, these further tests at least hinted to the eligibility of rec-
ognizing network size effects when analyzing cooperation levels. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  
Summary and Discussion 
A challenge to management research is to explain the emergence and evolution of cooperation 
in alliances and networks. In this paper we attempted to use insights from evolutionary 
(game) theory and cultural and social learning in order to shed light on this topic. We elabo-
rated on a conceptual model and provided conditions and cooperative mechanisms that enable 
the dynamic proliferation of cooperative strategies in economic settings. In particular, we in-
troduced three evolutionary principles, kin selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciproc-
ity, and demonstrated how these mechanisms can bring about cooperation. We argued that 
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 these principles are complemented by cultural transmission mechanisms, e.g. prestige-biased 
and conformist transmission, which describe how cultural learning supports the evolution of 
cooperation.  
We have then applied our conceptual model to the case of franchising, which suites well 
for giving a flavor of how to incorporate evolutionary theory into the analysis of collabora-
tions. In the first stage, the franchisor pursues one of his managerial core duties: screening 
and matching agents, whereby franchisees’ degree of relatedness is enhanced (kin selection). 
In the second stage, franchisees find together for interaction, while cooperation is fostered by 
the mechanisms of direct and indirect reciprocity. We discussed three contingency variables, 
(1) franchisee’s network position, (2) length of chain affiliation, and (3) network (over-)size, 
which may determine the effectiveness of direct and indirect reciprocity.  
Finally, we provided preliminary evidence using a sample of 168 German franchisees. 
The results show that store owners tend to engage more in cooperative activities if they oc-
cupy locations with a relatively high number of owners in their neighborhood, and franchisees 
cooperate more with others as length of network membership increases. The results confirmed 
our propositions 1 and 2. Yet, we could not confirm the proposition that franchisees tend to 
cooperate less as they perceive their local network as being oversized (one explanation for 
this null-finding might be that exclusive territory assignments attenuate competition within 
the focal chain). 
In our paper we considered recent results in evolutionary (game) theory and we propo-
sed culture, i.e. fast operating cultural transmission mechanisms, as a link between evolutio-
nary theory and a managerial perspective on collaborations. Future research should further 
clarify both the importance and the attractiveness of integrating evolutionary theory into the 
analysis of inter-firm cooperation in real-life settings. With regards to our empirical study, we 
would welcome more fine-grained tests of our propositions. In particular, one may analyze 
cooperation longitudinally and compare different populations of firms while assessing 
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 whether networks or groups vary with respect to cooperation levels. Possible differences in 
cooperation activities might be explained by more or less favorable conditions for kinship, 
direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity to promote cooperative behavior. Future studies 
may also continue by measuring constructs such as partner relatedness as well as the actual 
use of reciprocal strategies in order to more directly relate network partners’ working condi-
tions to the functionality of evolutionary rules of cooperation. In doing so researchers could 
deepen our understanding of the relation between the fields of evolutionary (game) theory and 
cultural anthropology and strategic management, with its subfields. We believe that bringing 
together these different approaches is fruitful, since rigorous models from evolutionary theory 
help to develop testable hypotheses in strategy research. We conclude with a preliminary re-
mark on the managerial implication. The approaches brought together here lead to a new per-
spective on the role of alliance and network management: We submit that cultural transmis-
sion mechanisms, with success or prestige and conformist biases, make comparatively high 
levels of conformity a prerequisite for success. 
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 Dependent variable: 
franchisee cooperation 
# franchisee’s outlets -0.(0.
016 
082)  
# franchisee’s employees -0.(0.
071 
092)  
working hours per week 0.(0.
005 
009) 
 opportunism of other 
franchisees 
-0.
(0.
180** 
064) 
 
network position 0.(0.
066* 
028) 
relationship duration 0.(0.
047† 
025)  
network (over-)size -0.
(0.
068 
053)  
n 130 
 F 2.983** 
R2 0.145  
Adjusted R2 0.096 
Table 2. Regression Results 
Table 3. Mann-Whitney-U Tests. 
 Significance levels: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05;  
† p < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 Grouping variable: 
network (over-)size* 
relationship  
duration 
opportunism of 
other franchisees 
franchisee 
cooperation 
Mann-Whitney-U 1963.00 2207.00 2207.00 
Wilcoxon-W 4378.00 5057.00 4835.00 
Z -2.043 -1.709 -2.037 
p 0.041 0.087 0.042 
n 140 145 148 
Mean: group 0 5.831 5.133 4.417 
Mean: group 1 5.203 5.557 4.009 
* Values from 0 to 3 = 0 (“no”), values from 4 to 7 = 1 (“yes”); mean: 0.483, s.e.: 0.501. 
 
Grouping variable: 
network (over-)size* 
relationship  
duration 
opportunism of 
other franchisees 
franchisee 
cooperation 
Mann-Whitney-U 1533.000 1624.500 1747.000 
Wilcoxon-W 2436.000 6775.500 2782.000 
Z -2.405 -2.655 -2.387 
p 0.016 0.008 0.017 
n 140 145 148 
mean group 0 6.071 5.139 4.388 
mean group 1 4.238 5.796 3.830 
* Values from 0 to 4 = 0 (“no”), values from 5 to 7 = 1 (“yes”); mean: 0.305, s.e.: 0.462. 
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